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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
great the nonassertive value of the statement the danger of
misuse requires it to be excluded. Among statements offered
nonassertively, prior inconsistent statements are peculiar. Be-
cause they are clothed with many safeguards including the
opportunity to question the witness on the stand and because
they serve a vital state interest, prior inconsistent statements
are more readily admissible than most other statements offered
nonassertively. Even with prior inconsistent statements it would
appear that any substantial danger of misuse by the jury would
bring the statement within the prohibition of the confrontation
clause.
J. Broocks Greer, III
INCOME TAX EFFECTS ON PERSONAL
INJURY RECOVERIES
In spite of their obvious importance, the income tax effects
on personal injury recoveries have caused considerable confu-
sion for more than fifty years.' In the midst of this confusion the
attorney is called upon to advise his client in such a manner
that the latter can pay the proper tax required of him, if any.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the income tax ef-
fects on personal injury recoveries in four areas. Specifically,
this Comment will examine the successful plaintiff's income tax
liability, the deductibility of defendant's personal injury pay-
ment, income tax as a factor in measuring damages, and instruc-
tions to the jury as to income tax consequences.
Plaintiff's Income Tax Liability
As to income taxability, injury awards are divided into two
classes, personal and non-personal; each is accorded a different
tax treatment. The rule for non-personal compensatory injury
awards is that damages and other recoveries follow the tax
treatment which would have been accorded the underlying
claim.2 Thus, in all non-personal injuries, the question is "[i]n
1. The exemption of personal injury awards from gross income was
first found in the INT. REV. CODE of 1918, § 213(6).
2. This principle was first recognized In Farmers' and Merchants'
Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932). It Is now well established.
See United States v. Safety Car Heating Co., 297 U.S. 88 (1936); Durkee v.
Commissioner, 162 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1947); Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944); Swastika Oil & Gas Co. v. Com-
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lieu of what were the damages awarded. . . . "s This well-
established "in lieu of" test means that if the underlying claim
would have been taxable, i.e., damage to income or lost profits,
then the recovery would also be taxable. If the underlying claim
would not be taxable, i.e., damages to capital or goodwill, then
the award compensating for such loss would also be nontaxable.4
As to compensatory personal injury awards, there is no
need to examine the underlying claim. The rule is simply stated
in Section 104 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code:
"IN GENE,---Except in the case of amounts attributable to
(and not in excess of) deductions allowed under section
213 (relating to medical, etc. expenses) for any prior tax-
able year, gross income does not include-
"(2) the amount of any damage received (whether by suit
or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness;
"5
It has been suggested that the reason compensatory personal
injury awards were excluded from gross income was the con-
gressional desire to give a tax benefit to the injured plaintiff. e
In truth, however, the justification for the exemption was the
belief that such payments were not income within the meaning
of the sixteenth amendment, 7 because such accessions were not
missioner, 123 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1940). See also Guardino, Tax Aspects
of Recoveries and Damages, 5 TRIAL 34 (1969); Note, 40 CORN. L.Q. 345
(1955).
3. Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.
1944).
4. Recoveries representing a reimbursement of "lost profits" are income
and taxable to the recipient. Swastika Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 123
F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 639 (1943); H. Liebes & Co.
v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1937); Herman J. Sternberg, 32
B.T.A. 1039 (1935). On the other hand, recoveries representing a return of
goodwill are not income and not taxable to the recipient. Durkee v.
Commissioner, 162 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1932); State Fish Corp., 49 T.C. 13
(1967). When the recovery represents both items, an allocation is frequently
made, if there is a basis to do so. See Note, 40 CORN. L.Q. 345 (1955).
5. The INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 104, also specifically excludes from
gross income amounts received as compensation for personal injuries or
sickness under workmen's compensation acts and accident or health insur-
ance policies. Amounts received by an employee under an employer-financed
accident and health plan which constitute wages during a period of absence
are likewise specifically excluded, within fixed limits.
6. Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Dixie
Feed & Seed Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619, 376 S.W.2d 745 (1963), appeal
dismissed, 379 U.S. 15 (1964); see Note, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1495 (1956).
7. H.R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1917).
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derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.8 Such
payments were merely an attempt to make the plaintiff whole
again, to compensate him for his losses." Of course, this reason-
ing is not totally accurate, since the compensatory personal in-
jury award normally includes elements, such as lost wages or
future earnings, which would otherwise be taxable. Nonethe-
less, the illogical rule has persisted, in part, at least, because of
the difficulties of separating the taxable and nontaxable ele-
ments of the personal injury and the public policy of not de-
siring to overburden the injured plaintiff. Since the difficulties
in making such a separation are not as burdensome in the non-
personal injury, a plaintiff suffering from this type of injury
will not receive the same tax advantage.
When one examines the language exempting personal injury
awards from taxability in Section 104 of the Internal Revenue
Code, several observations can be made. First, the language is
broad; it covers personal injuries whether physical or not. Sec-
ond, the exemption is limited to natural persons, artificial per-
sons being excluded by implication of the first sentence of the
section. Third, the amount received for personal injuries will be
excluded from gross income whether the award results from a
final judgment or a compromise settlement. Fourth, there is no
distinction between compensatory and punitive awards for per-
sonal injuries; from a strict interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage, both should be nontaxable.
In view of the total exclusion of compensatory personal in-
jury awards from gross income, the courts have been extremely
strict in their interpretation of "personal injury."'1 In the past,
damages for physical injury," defamatory statements injuring
the plaintiff's personal reputation,12 surrender of custody rights, 8
8. This classic definition of income was formulated in Eisner v. Macomb-
er, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
9. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955); C. A.
Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927); I.T. 2420, VII-2 CuM. BULL. 123 (1928);
Sol. Op. 132, I-1 CuM. BULL. 92 (1922).
10. The government will receive some benefit from the award, none-
theless, since the attorney's fee is taxable to the attorney and the interest
on the award Is taxable. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61(a)(1), (4).
11. Theodate Pope Riddle, 27 B.T.A. 1339 (1933).
12. C. A. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927); see Sol. Op. 132, I-1 CuM. BULL.
92 (1922).
13. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 CUM. ButL. 92 (1922).
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wrongful death, 4 breach of a promise of marriage, 15 marriage
procured by fraud and deceit,16 invasion of privacy, 7 and aliena-
tion of affections' have been considered nontaxable. However,
noticeably absent from both the statute and the cases is any
definition of a personal injury, and not all injuries to an indi-
vidual are considered "personal." One observation can be made
from the above cases: whether the injury arose out of contract
or tort is not the determining criterion. One early distinction
between personal and non-personal injuries was that there must
be an injury to a personal as opposed to a property right-the
latter being characterized by its ability to be assigned or trans-
ferred.19 More recently, a more satisfactory line has been drawn
between injuries to the individual's personal and business ca-
pacities.20 Thus, amounts received by an individual for breach of
an employment contract,2' for breach of a promise to reimburse
an individual for attention, care, and nursing,2 2 for cancellation
of a real estate lease,23 as compensation for past services,24 as a
lump compromise of a partnership interest,25 for patent infringe-
ment,26 and for damage to property 27 were all non-personal in-
14. Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D. S.C. 1967); Anderson
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960); I.T. 2420, VII-2
CUM. BULL. 123 (1928); see Rev. Rul. 19, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 179.
15. Mrs. Lyde McDonald, 9 B.T.A. 1340 (1928), acquiesced in, G.C.M.
4363, VII-2 Cum. BULL. 185 (1928); I.T. 1804, 11-2 CUM. BULL. 61 (1923).
16. I.T. 1852, 11-2 CUm. BULL. 66 (1923).
17. Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962); Miller v.
Commissioner, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962);
Meyer v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Tenn. 1959); Franklin D.
Roosevelt, 43 T.C. 77 (1964). For discussion, see Fouts, Payments Received
in Settlement of Litigation and Claims, 1967 N.Y.U. 25TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
555.
18. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 Cums. BULL. 92 (1922).
19. See Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 Cum. BULL. 92 (1922).
20. Mason K. Knuckles, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 182 (1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d
610 (10th Cir. 1965); Nathan Agar, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 116 (1960), aff'd,
290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961); see Rev. Rul. 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 18 (1958).
21. George K. Gann, 41 B.T.A. 388 (1940) (taxable); August Merckens,
7 B.T.A. 32 (1927) (taxable); Mason K. Knuckles, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
182 (1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965) (taxable).
22. Cole L. Blease, 16 B.T.A. 972 (1929) (taxable).
23. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (taxable).
24. Julian C. Stanford, 34 T.C. 1150 (1960) (taxable); Joseph R. Culhane,
31 T.C. 758 (1959) (taxable).
25. Specialty Eng'r Co., 12 T.C. 1173 (1949) (part of award representing
taxpayer's interest in patent was capital and nontaxable).
26. Mathey v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 943 (1950) (taxable); Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Latchum, 44 F. Supp.
436 (D. Del. 1942), aff'd, 131 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1942) (taxable); W. W. Sly
Mfg. Co., 24 B.T.A. 65 (1931) (taxable); see Estate of G. A. E. Kohler, 37
B.T.A. 1019 (1938) (taxable).
27. Boehm v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1945), afj'd on other
grounds, 326 U.S. 287 (1945) (not taxable); Commissioner v. Norfolk So.
R.R., 63 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1933) (not taxable).
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jury awards. The rationale of these cases was that the plaintiff
was injured in his business capacity; hence, the injury was non-
personal.
The importance of this distinction for a plaintiff's attorney
is obvious. In order to work a tax benefit for his client the
attorney should present the case from the viewpoint that the
injury suffered was personal. For example, a doctor who is
libeled may suffer damages to both his personal and his busi-
ness reputations. Although damages received for an injury to
personal reputation by defamatory statements are not taxable,28
damages received for an injury to business reputation are con-
sidered non-personal and taxable. 29 Probably, there will be an
injury to both reputations, and the Commissioner, if there is
some evidence on which to make an allocation, will specify a
portion of the award as taxable and a portion as nontaxable. 80
If there is no evidence on which an allocation can be made, the
commissioner will either tax or exempt the entire award, de-
pending on the gravamen of the injury."' Quite often, since
there is no basis on which an allocation can be made in settle-
ments, the commissioner will subject the entire award to the
income tax.82
28. C. A. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927); see Sol. Op. 132, I-1 CuM. BULL.
92 (1922).
29. See Rev. Rul. 418, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 18; Sol. Op. 132, I-1 Cum. BULL.
92 (1922). See also Mason K. Knuckles, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 182 (1964),
aff'd, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965); Nathan Agar, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 116
(1960), aff'd, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961).
30. Telefilm, Inc., 21 T.C. 688 (1954); Obear-Nester Glass Co., 20 T.C.
1102 (1953); Glenshaw Glass Co., 18 T.C. 860 (1952); Anna Levens, 20 P-H
1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. V. 51,330 (1951).
31. Arcadia Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1941);
H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1937); Armstrong
Knitting Mills, 19 B.T.A. 318 (1930). Once the Commissioner has determined
that the award is income, the burden is then upon the recipient to show
that the Commissioner's finding was irrelevant. Armstrong Knitting Mills,
19 B.T.A. 318 (1930).
32. Nathan Agar, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 116 (1960), aff'd, 290 F.2d 283
(2d Cir. 1961), provides an interesting illustration of the difficulties in
determining whether or not a settlement is a personal injury award. Plain-
tiff had a five-year employment contract as an officer with a corporation,
but the corporation lost confidence in him before the contract had expired.
Claiming that the corporation's attitude resulted In damages to his health,
plaintiff instituted a suit for personal injuries from the alleged abuse.
Holding that the settlement payments were in the nature of severance pay
and extra compensation-taxable as income, the Tax Court rationalized
that the final Inquiry in a close case must be made into the basic motiva-
tion for the corporation's payment, and that the plaintiff's belief was only
evidence of the character of the payment. The court also pointed out that
even if the payments had been made in the settlement of a tort claim, the
gravamen of that claim was an injury to business reputation and thus non-
personal.
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The attorney should also be mindful of the strictness with
which the courts view the language "personal injuries." For
example, in Meyer v. United States,33 the plaintiff agreed to the
use of her name and certain personal correspondence in a pro-
posed film. Although the court found that no violation of plain-
tiff's right of privacy had in fact occurred, it added in dictum
that, even if there would have been an invasion, the payments
would not have been tax exempt. Later cases are in accord.34
The court emphasized that the statutory exclusion was only for
the amount of any damage received for personal injuries. Al-
though logically there should be no difference in the tax treat-
ment accorded advance and subsequent payments for privacy
invasions, since both are personal injuries, only the latter are
exempt from income tax.
As to punitive damages for personal injuries, the. rule is that
punitive damages are income and taxable to the recipient.3 5 The
reason asserted for this rule is that punitive damages, unlike
compensatory damages, are not a restoration of the plaintiff's
capital. 86 This rationale is consistent with respect to non-personal
injuries since whether an award for this type of injury is to be
taxed depends upon the underlying claim. With respect to per-
sonal injuries, however, there is no need to examine the under-
lying claim, and this rationale seems inappropriate. It may be
that the real reason punitive personal injury awards are taxable
is the tax court's unwillingness to grant an exemption in view
of the large size of the awards and the lack of any public policy
Although this case established the principle that the intent of the payor
in making the payment was of primary importance in determining whether
a particular award is compensation for a personal injury, it is questionable
whether this principle is sound. It should not be the intent of the payor
which controls, but the nature of the injury. Certainly, if the taxpayer
suffered Injuries to his personal reputation, it could hardly be said that
this award would be taxable, merely because the payor intended the pay-
ment as extra compensation. Although the intent of the payor might be
a relevant factor in determining the character of the injury, other factors
of equal importance mentioned in Mason K. Knuckles, 23 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 182 (1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965), were (1) lack of a
previous acknowledgment of personal injuries, (2) absence of proof of per-
sonal injuries, and (3) evidence showing the plaintiff's purpose in charac-
terizing his injury as personal was solely for tax purposes.
33. 173 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).
34. See note 17 supra.
35. Rev. Rul. 418, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 18.
36. This rule was apparently adopted from the rule for punitive damages
for non-personal injuries, such awards being taxable as income. Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Ralph Freeman, 33 T.C. 323
(1959); Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 982 (1955); Chalmers Cullens, 24 T.C. 322 (1955).
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to necessitate an exemption. In short, the plaintiff receives one
tax advantage in not having his compensatory personal award
taxed; he should not receive a second for the punitive damages.
A final problem concerns prior medical deductions, since
compensatory personal injury awards will be nontaxable only
insofar as such recoveries exceed prior medical deductions.3 7
The problem becomes acute in lump sum settlements, since the
tax court must then allocate not only the amount of the award
which was for personal injuries, but also the amount attributable
to prior medical deductions. In order to avoid the risk of having
a portion of plaintiff's recovery unnecessarily subject to the in-
come tax, the attorney should obtain a statement from the payor
as to the portion of the award attributable to prior medical de-
ductions.
The Deductibility of Defendant's Personal Injury Payment
Once it has been determined that the plaintiff is entitled to
a personal injury award of a definite amount, the main tax ques-
tion confronting the defendant is whether the required payment
is deductible. To be deductible the personal injury payment
must be directly connected with, or have proximately resulted
from, the taxpayer's business.38 Personal expenses are specifically
prohibited from deduction by the code.8 9 The deduction will
also be disallowed, even though connected with the defendant's
business, if it would "frustrate some sharply defined public
policy."40
Although a detailed analysis of the requirements for a busi-
ness expense is not possible here, there are three conditions
which must be satisfied. The expense must be (1) incurred in
carrying on a trade or business, (2) ordinary and necessary, and
(3) paid or incurred within the taxable year.41 A fourth condi-
tion imposed by the courts is that it be for a business purpose.4
Because at least one of these requirements was not satisfied,
amounts paid as damages for a breach of a promise to marry,43
37. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 104.
38. For discussion, see Annot., 104 A.L.R. 680 (1936).
39. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 262; J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 25.17 (1966).
40. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 689 (1966); Commissioner v. Hein-
inger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943); see Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 603, § 1 (1951).
41. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a).
42. See J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.07 (1966).
43. O.D. 546, 2 Cum. BuLL. 157 (1919).
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for defamation, 4" and for a wrongful death action where the
death had no substantial relation to defendant's business,45 have
been held nondeductible, even though an incidental motive in
the last two examples was the protection of the taxpayer's busi-
ness.
Although the distinction between business and personal ex-
penses is theoretically clear, in practice it is often difficult to
delineate between the two. In William W. Harper,46 defendant
lessor invaded plaintiff lessee's privacy by installing a listening
device in the tenant's room. Although the defendant claimed
his settlement payment to the plaintiff was a business expense,
necessary to preserve the reputation of his rental business, the
tax court held that the payments constituted a personal expense,
and the protection afforded the rental business was only inci-
dental. No allocation was made. The failure of the tax court to
allocate illustrates the rule that if both personal and business
expenses are incurred, the burden is upon the taxpayer to make
the proper allocation between the two items.47 If an improper
or no allocation is made, the taxpayer runs the risk of being
denied a deduction of the entire amount.48
Income Taxes as a Factor in Measuring Damages
Although the Internal Revenue Code provides that personal
injury awards received by a plaintiff after a trial has concluded
are nontaxable, there is no statutory language which controls
the relationship of income taxes to the award during the trial.
At the same time, the issue of whether income before or after
taxes should be used in computing damages has received sporadic,
inconsistent treatment in the courtroom. The issue is still un-
decided in Louisiana, although the practice is to use gross in-
come in measuring the size of awards. 49 Until recently, the de-
cided majority of both federal and state courts had held that
44. Lloyd v. Commissioner, 55 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1932); Robert Edward
Kleinschmidt, 12 T.C. 921 (1949); Kerwin v. Fulton, 41 B.T.A. 1037 (1940),
aff'd, 128 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1942).
45. Cf. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
46. 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 705 (1963).
47. Arthur Jordan, 12 B.T.A. 423 (1928); Sam E. Broadhead, 25 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 133 (1966).
48. See J. MrRTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.17, at 91 n.75
(1966) and cases cited therein.
49. There are no Louisiana cases which expressly establish a rule either
for or against the income tax deduction. However, several Louisiana judges
have remarked that they used gross income in measuring damages.
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income tax consequences should not be taken into consideration
in computing damages and no evidence of plaintiff's tax liability
was admissible.5 0 Past income tax records were admissible only
to show what the plaintiff had earned before the injury or death,
or might have earned in the future-not to show previous or
future tax liability.
This majority rule has been strongly criticized.51 The basis
for this criticism is that because there is no statutory language
controlling the relationship of income taxes and the award dur-
ing the trial, the general rule for damages should govern the
size of plaintiff's award-the cardinal rule for damages in Anglo-
American law being that of compensation for plaintiff's injury. 2
Plaintiff should be put as nearly as possible in the same position
he would have been if defendant's wrong had not injured him.53
However, because plaintiff's personal injury award is nontaxable,
whereas frequently a portion or all of the underlying claim is
taxable, the plaintiff will usually be in a better tax position be-
50. Boston & Maine R.R. v. Talbert, 360 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1966); Cun-
ningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S, 333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964); Phoenix
Indem. Co. v. Givens, 263 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1959); Stokes v. United States,
144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R.R., 135 F.
Supp. 750 (Iowa 1955); Runnels v. City of Douglas, 124 F. Supp. 657 (D.
Alaska 1954); O'Donnel v. Great No. Ry., 109 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1951);
St. Johns River Term. Co. v. Vaden, 190 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1966); Hall v.
Chicago & N.W. R.R., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Spencer v. Martin
K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18 (1960); Hoge v. Anderson, 200
Va. 364, 106 S.E.2d 121 (1958); cf. Petition of Marina-Mercante Nicaraguense,
S.A., 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966); Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180(2d Cir. 1963). The modern trend allows the introduction of evidence of
income taxes and calculates damages as to income after deduction of these
taxes. O'Conner v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951); Neff v. United States, 282 F.
Supp. 910 (D. Colo. 1968); Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D. S.C.
1967) (limited to wrongful death); Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp.
981 (D. Hawaii 1965); Petition of Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc., 184 F.
Supp. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); See Moffa v. Perkins Trucking Co., 200 F. Supp.
183 (D. Conn. 1961); Armentrout v. Virginia Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997 (S.D.W.Va.
1947); Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957). See
also LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965); United States v. Sommers, 351 F.2d 354(10th Cir. 1965); Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
De Vito v. United Air Lines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
51. See, e.g., Burns, A Compensation for Personal Injury or Wrongful
Death Is Tax-Exempt: Should We Tell the Jury?, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 320(1965); Morris, Should Juries in Personal Injury Cases Be Instructed That
Plaintiffs' Recoveries Are Not Income Within the Meaning of Federal Tax
Law ?, 3 DEF. L.J. 3 (1958); Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury
Awards, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 212 (1958); Comment, 7 ARiZ. L. Rev. 272 (1966);
Note, 46 N.C. L. REv. 941 (1968); Note, 50 Ky. L.J. 601 (1962).
52. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1 (1956); C. Mc-
CORMIcK, DAMAGES § 137 (1935).
53. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1 (1956); see Note,
50 Ky. L.J. 601 (1962).
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cause of the injury, unless the court recognizes this tax saving
and computes damages using net income as a measure of plain-
tiff's loss. As stated in a leading text on torts, "the argument
for computing damages on estimated income after taxes is a
clear one: this will measure the actual loss. If plaintiff gets, in
tax-free damages, an amount on which he would have had to
pay taxes if he had gotten it as wages, the plaintiff is getting
more than he lost. '5 4 The Louisiana Civil Code provides that
"every act whatever of man that causes damage to another,
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."55 But the
defendant's fault does not oblige him to bestow a bonus upon
the plaintiff.
Advocates of the use of a net income formula to measure
plaintiff's loss have strongly criticized the five basic arguments
used by the courts in justifying the majority position. One of
these arguments was that basing damages on net earnings would
nullify the tax benefit conferred by Congress expressly exempt-
ing damages for personal injuries. 56 As mentioned earlier, how-
ever, the original reason for this exemption was the simple be-
lief that such award was not income within the meaning of the
sixteenth amendment.5T Likewise, critics of the majority rule
argue that the public policy reason which has maintained this
exemption-that an injured plaintiff should not have his award
reduced by a forced payment of an income tax-certainly does
not necessitate any particular method of determining which
elements constitute the award. In effect, the "congressional in-
tent" argument appears to be but another attempt to justify a
settled rule by imputing a non-existent intent to a legislative
body.58
A second argument to justify the majority rule was made
in the first case in the United States to confront this problem:
future income tax liability was simply too conjectural.59 For
54. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.12, at 1326 (1956).
55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.
56. See note 6 supra.
57. See note 7 supra.
58. For further discussion of this counter-argument to the congressional
intent argument, see Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards,
19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212 (1958); Note, 46 N.C. L. REV. 941 (1968).
59. Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944). Although this
reasoning has been followed in many cases, e.g., Petition of Oskar Tiede-
mann & Co., 236 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1964); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5
Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251
S.W.2d 42 (1952); Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App.
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example, in McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R.,6 0 the court
was confronted with the future income tax liability and possible
future exemptions of a thirty-nine year old bachelor. It won-
dered whether it should consider the possibility of marriage.
What was the likelihood that the possible wife might have chil-
dren from a previous marriage? What was the probability that
the plaintiff would father children? All the while, tax rates
would be continually changing. If the plaintiff were younger,
the whole process would become even more conjectural. None-
theless, critics of the gross income formula point out that mathe-
matical certainty is not possible in awarding damages,6' and
future income tax liability is hardly more inexact than a prog-
nosis of life expectancy and probable future earnings. Even
though the result is only approximate, the generally accepted
rule is that a jury or court will make an estimate of damages, if
there is a reasonable basis for a computation.6 2 Admittedly, the
size of the deduction would probably not be totally accurate. But,
if no deduction is made, the award would be even more inaccu-
rate. The use of tax experts, income tax returns, and cross-
examination of the plaintiff would greatly reduce the amount of
conjecture.
Another argument frequently asserted is based upon the
"collateral source" doctrine.6 3 This doctrine states that compen-
sation received by a party from a source wholly independent of
the tortfeasor will not lessen the damages recoverable from the
tortfeasor. 64 The validity of this doctrine is questionable since the
plaintiff is only entitled to compensation. 5 But even if accepted,
the doctrine is not applicable to the instant problem. First, it is
difficult to understand how a situation in which the government
1953). It is enlightening that in the original case the court disposed of this
problem in five words: " . . . such deductions are too conjectural." Stokes v.
United States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944).
60. 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960).
61. Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967); Brooks
v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D. S.C. 1967).
62. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 26(c) 1966. For example, it is an accepted prac-
tice for the jury to estimate future earnings. 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§
910, 924(d) (1939).
63. See Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal
Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274 (1960).
64. 22 AM. JuR. 2d Damages § 206 (1965). Thus, plaintiff who has been
paid his salary or a pension during disability, or had his medical expense
paid by another or by insurance, can nevertheless recover the full amount
of his damages from the defendant. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 25.22 (1956).
65. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.12 (1956).
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releases an individual from an obligation could be considered
"compensation." Nothing is given to the plaintiff; he simply is
excused from a duty. Second, even if the "release" were con-
sidered "compensation," the Internal Revenue Code merely
exempts the award from taxation, and has no relevance to the
elements to be considered in determining the amount of the
award. The exemption does not even come into being until after
the trial has ended. 66
An additional argument used to justify the majority rule
is that the introduction of income taxes into the courtroom would
unduly complicate the trial and cause difficulties in trial ad-
ministration.6 7 But, even though taxes are complicated, "are
they any more complicated than annuity and mortality tables,
reduction to present worth or any of a hundred problems that
courts and justices solve every day?" 68 Although the introduc-
tion of income tax evidence would certainly add an element of
complexity into the courtroom, the additional element is neces-
sary to prevent the defendant from paying an unwarranted sum
to the plaintiff. Tax experts could assist the court. Moreover,
since the introduction of evidence and proof of income tax
liability would benefit the defendant, it would seem that the
burden of proof of such liability should be placed upon him. He
would thus either carry the burden and minimize his liability,
or fail to carry it with the resulting consequences.
Finally, it has been argued recently that the advantages
resulting to the plaintiff from figuring the award on gross earn-
ings are justified by the fact that these blessings are offset by
attorney's fees and inflation. First made in McWeeney v. New
York, N.H. & H. R.R. 69 this contention established the flexible
rule that damages should be based on gross earnings except
66. For discussion, see Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries
and the Federal Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274 (1960); Note, 50 Ky. L.J.
601 (1962).
67. Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa
1955); Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956); Higshew v.'
Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555 (1956); Pflster v. Cleveland, 96 Ohio
App. 185, 113 N.E.2d 366 (1953), appeal di.smissed, 159 Ohio St. 580, 112 N.E.2d
657 (1953).
68. Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal
Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274, 328 (1960).
69. McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960).
Although this rule was formulated in a jury case, it has been followed in
non-jury cases. Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaraguese, 364 F.2d 118 (2d
Cir. 1966); Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S, 333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir.
1964).
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where such an award "would be plainly excessive even after
taking full account of the countervailing factors [i.e., inflation
and attorney's fees] .. .. ,0 Although the McWeeney rule,
formulated in the Second Circuit and adopted in the Seventh
Circuit,71 might appear just at first glance, it was pointed out in
a strong dissent that the defendant too must live with inflation,
and that it was not inconceivable that the plaintiff would invest
the money in such a way that he would be protected against
both inflation and deflation. As for attorney's fees, it can be
argued that the public policy of not overburdening the defen-
dant should exempt him from paying this amount. It is thus
contrary to this policy for the losing party to be burdened with
this; increased payment. The McWeeney rule has been further
criticized as discriminatory with respect to the plaintiff, since
the controlling factor has no relation to the amount of damage
suffered and would not reduce the element of conjecture as to
his future tax liability.72
Thus the past justifications for the majority rule are subject
to attack, and it might be advisable for the courts to modify
their present position and apply a net earnings formula in
awarding damages. Relying on a series of articles in favor of
the deduction of income taxes from the award,78 federal courts
more recently have computed damages using net earnings as
a measure of plaintiff's loss in both personal injury and death
awards.74 In the same light, the British House of Lords in 1955
overruled numerous decisions and held that income tax conse-
quences must be considered in assessing damages.7 5 With in-
70. McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1960).
In this case the annual income involved was $4,800.00 and the deduction was
denied. The deduction was likewise denied where annual incomes involved
were $6,281.00, Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S, 333 F.2d 308 (2d
Cir. 1964), and $11,150.00, Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.
1963). The deduction was appropriate in a case involving an annual income of
$16,000.00. LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965).
71. Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967).
72. Note, 14 VAND. L. Rev. 639 (1961). See Brooks v. United States, 273
F. Supp. 619 (D. S.C. 1967).
73. See note 51 supra.
74. E.g., Cunningham v. Rederlet Vindeggen A/S, 333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir.
1964); Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965). How-
ever, in Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619 (D. S.C. 1967), noted in
46 N.C. L. REV. 941 (1968), a distinction was made between wrongful death
and personal injury awards and the holding that net earnings should be
used in computing damages was limited to wrongful death actions.
75. British Transp: Comm'n v. Gourley, 3 All E.R. 796 (1955). The
opinion by Lord Jowitt emphasized that "to ignore the tax element at the
present day would be to act in a manner which is out of touch with reality."
Id. at 802.
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creasing insurance rates and a no-fault doctrine of tort liability
possible in the future, the use of the net earnings formula in
awarding damages would be one way to decrease the strain on
insurance companies and hopefully decrease insurance premiums.
It is the opinion of this writer, however, that the gross earn-
ings formula is the best rule, in spite of the fact that the past
arguments justifying this rule are inaccurate. The reason is
simple. The government has decided not to tax personal injury
awards. The question is who should receive the benefit of this
exemption: the plaintiff or the defendant? Although the statute
exempting personal injury awards was enacted under a mis-
conception, the statute has not been repealed, primarily because
of the public policy against overburdening the injured plaintiff.
When the net earnings formula is used, the defendant receives
the advantage of this tax exemption, and the public policy
against overburdening the plaintiff is defeated. In spite of the
fact that Congress's original misconception surrounding the
exemption has become well known, this policy has prevented
any change in the law. Critics of the gross income formula be-
lieve that the present majority practice works a hardship on
the defendant. But if Congress had enacted an income tax law
and had at the same time made no exemption for personal
injury awards, defendant would still be required to compensate
a disabled plaintiff for his loss without regard to income taxes, and
plaintiff would then pay a certain sum to the government. Should
the fact that Congress has not followed this policy, but has
enacted an income tax law exempting personal injury recoveries
from this tax, decrease defendant's payment? To answer in the
affirmative is to deny plaintiff his tax benefit, which public
policy has dictated that he have. In addition, it should be recog-
nized that plaintiff's benefit in many cases is partly or even
completely destroyed by attorney's fees.
Instructing the Jury as to Income Tax Consequences
At this point, it is necessary to distinguish two related
problems: whether the correct measure of damages should be
based upon plaintiff's gross or net income, analyzed in the pre-
ceding section of this paper; and whether juries should or should
not be given an income tax instruction. Frequently, a court's
refusal to allow an income tax instruction results from a con-
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fusion of these two questions.7 0 Measuring damages by gross in-
come does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that juries
should be denied an instruction to the effect that the award
is not income within the meaning of the tax laws and that they
should neither add nor subtract to the award because of this
fact. If such an instruction is refused, it is likely that the plain-
tiff will receive two tax bonuses-the first in having his award
based on gross income and the second in the extra compensa-
tion which it is quite likely the jury will mistakenly add to the
award to protect the plaintiff from income taxes.
There are two basic types of income tax instructions. The
first type arises in those jurisdictions which use the net income
formula in awarding damages. Here the charge should state that
the jury should consider the fact that plaintiff's award is not
subject to income taxes. 77 Affirmative action-the deduction of
past and future income taxes-is required by this charge. An
example is: "If you decide to render a verdict in favor of plain-
tiff, you should calculate any past or future loss of earnings on
the basis of net income, after deduction of income taxes." In
those systems which use the net earnings formula, this type of
instruction would appear to be required. Otherwise, both the
plaintiff in a case without a jury and the defendant in a case
with a jury would be discriminated against, since a pro-plaintiff
measure of damages would be used in the non-jury case and a
pro-defendant measure of damages would be used in the jury
case.
The main argument against using this instruction is that
the jury cannot perform this complicated task. Proponents of
this line of reasoning forget, however, that federal juries often
handle complicated economic questions such as anti-trust suits
and tax refunds. In addition, the burden is upon the plaintiff to
76. E.g., Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555 (1956). The state
supreme court denied the requested charge on the grounds that it involved
"intricate instructions on tax and non-tax liabilities with all the regulations
pertinent thereto." Id. at 505, 134 N.E.2d at 556. Although the charge is not
listed, language in the case Indicates that the instruction consisted of noth-
ing more than that the award would not be subject to income tax and the
plaintiff should neither add to nor subtract from the award because of
this fact. Thus, the size of plaintiff's tax liability would never arise.
77. This type of instruction was given in Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144
Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957). At the same time, the jury was cautioned
"against attempting to use evidence which the defendants had offered . ..
in any arithmatical computation because of the inherent uncertainty in the
amount of taxes which the decedent would have to pay.... Id. at 673, 136
A.2d at 926.
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establish his total past and future loss of earnings. Once this is
done, it would not be an impossible task for the jury to deduct
a certain portion of the award for income taxes. Past income tax
returns and tax experts could be made available to assist the
jury. Mathematical exactness would not be required. Nonethe-
less, even though this writer feels that juries could handle this
complicated task, this type of instruction should be given only
in those jurisdictions which use the net income formula in
awarding damages. Louisiana is not currently one of those states.
A second type of instruction should be used in those juris-
dictions which apply gross income in measuring damages. In
these jurisdictions, the charge should likewise consist of one or
two sentences, and should explain that the award is nontaxable
and that the jury should not consider income taxes in the com-
putation of damages.78 No affirmative action is necessitated. An
example of this type instruction would be:
"Any award made to plaintiff, if any is made, is not income
within the meaning of the income tax laws. If you decide
to make an award, follow the instructions previously given,
and neither add nor subtract from that award on account
of federal or state income taxes."' 9
Basing their belief on the premise that juries will add noth-
ing to the award on account of income taxes hoping thereby to
allow the plaintiff to receive just compensation, the majority of
American courts, using the gross income measure of damages,
almost universally refuse to allow any sort of income tax in-
struction.80 However, this basic assumption should be questioned.
78. This type of instruction was given in Anderson v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Poirier v. Shireman, 129 So.2d 439 (Fla.
App. 1961); Spencer v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18
(1960); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952). In addition,
the Supreme Courts of Ohio and Wisconsin indicated that this type of in-
struction could be given if properly drafted. See Maus v. New York, C. & St.
L. R.R., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d 253 (1956); Behringer v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 6 Wis.2d 595, 95 N.W.2d 249 (1959).
79. Proper drafting of the instruction can hardly be over emphasized.
It has even been suggested that the primary problem with the income tax
instruction is one of form and not substance. See Comment, 18 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1 (1961).
80. E.g., Payne v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 309 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1962);
Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa 1955);
Wagner v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 7 IIl.App.2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955); Spencer
v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 186 Kan. 345, 350 P.2d 18 (1960); Bracy v.
Great No. Ry., 343 P.2d 848 (Mont. 1959); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harry
Crow & Son, Inc., 6 Wis.2d 396, 94 N.W.2d 577 (1959). The majority of the
federal courts hold that such an instruction is discretionary, although it is
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By design, juries are composed of a cross-section of the American
populace who pay income taxes and possess no legal discipline.
The impact of taxes is so well known that it is at least reason-
able to assume that the jury might add to the verdict an amount
which it erroneously believes to be due for income taxes.8' Since
the plaintiff is entitled to have the jury instructed as to each
item of his loss, it seems only just that the defendant, who must
pay the damages, is likewise entitled to have the jury instructed
in such a manner that he does not over-compensate the plaintiff.
"Even handed justice requires nothing less than this."8 2
Unfortunately, because the majority of American courts
refuse to allow an instruction to the effect that plaintiff's award
is nontaxable, there is little evidence to illustrate the actual role
income taxes play in the minds of jurors. One possibly en-
lightening case, however, is Wagner v. Illinois Central R.R. 5
When no income tax instruction was given on the first trial, the
plaintiff, suing for personal injuries, received $130,000.00. At a
second trial, a simple instruction to the effect "that any award
made to plaintiff as damages ... is not subject to federal income
taxes, and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the
amount of any award made to plaintiff"8 4 resulted in a verdict
and judgment of $80,000.00 Although this second award was not
allowed because the appellate court found the income tax in-
struction prejudicial error, the case demonstrates the possible
effect a jury's misconception of tax consequences might have
on the size of awards.
Courts have offered several reasons for their refusal to give
the instruction: it is unnecessary, since the jury will follow the
general instruction on damages;8 5 it is cautionary in nature;86
seldom given. See, e.g., McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d
34 (2d Cir. 1960); contra, Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97
(S.D. Cal. 1960).
81. See Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952);
"Can there be any sound reason for not so instructing the jury? We can
think of none. Surely, the plaintiff has no right to receive an enhanced award
due to a possible and, we think, probable misconception on the part of ajury that the amount allowed by it will be reduced by income taxes. Such
an instruction would at once and for all purposes take the subject of income
taxes out of the case."
82. McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.
1960) (dissenting opinion).
83. 7 Ill.App.2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955).
84. Id. at 446-47, 129 N.E.2d at 772.
85. Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956); Hall v. Chi-
cago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
86. Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa
1955).
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it introduces an extraneous matter;87 it would unduly compli-
cate the trial;88 it would constitute prejudicial error; 9 and it
might influence jurors to subtract from plaintiff's award.90 Even
when the gross income measure of damages is used, however,
these reasons do not justify the refusal of courts to give the
second type of instruction suggested, that jurors should not con-
sider income tax in awarding damages. As mentioned earlier,
jurors are drawn from all sections of life and possess normal
conceptions and misconceptions. One advantage the members of a
jury possess is their common knowledge, from which they are per-
mitted to draw.91 The judge's instructions are a control device over
the jury,92 and a cautionary instruction on income tax would cer-
tainly seem justified.93 An element of complexity would not be
added to the trial. The idea that plaintiff's award is nontaxable
and that nothing should be added to or subtracted from the
award because of this fact is certainly not overly complicated.
The English language surely can be fashioned to convey this
meaning to twelve laymen. Finally, if the instruction is care-
fully framed, the plaintiff would not receive a reduced verdict
and would certainly not suffer prejudicial error. Granted, he will
not receive an increased verdict, but he will receive both ade-
quate compensation and the tax benefit.
The main argument in favor of the instruction, even in
those courts which use gross income in obtaining an award, is
that it will remove an element of conjecture from the trial. With
the evidence presently available, it cannot be proved that juries
actually add an amount to the award because of income taxes.
On the other hand, it is certainly not inconceivable that they
might. When a simple instruction is given, the result seems
certain: the award will not be increased because of income taxes.
In Louisiana, there appears to be only one reported case in
87. See note 85 supra.
88. Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
89. Wagner v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 7 Ill.App.2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 771 (1955).
90. See Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal.
1960); Hall v. Chicago N.W. Ry., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
91. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2570 (3d ed. 1940).
92. For discussion, see Kalven, The Jury, The Law and The Personal
Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158 (1958).
93. It is a misconception that cautionary instructions are infrequently
given. In fact, in a study of a compilation of instructions, it was revealed
that of 230 instructions, 143 were in whole or in part cautionary. Morris &
Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal Income Tax Law,
46 A.B.A.J. 274 (1960).
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which the instruction was requested, and it was refused.94 Un-
fortunately, most courts in practice refuse the instruction. A
change in the Louisiana practice should be made. If Louisiana
were to adopt the net earnings formula for measuring damages,
then the first type of instruction mentioned-that the jury should
consider income taxes in the award of damages-should be
given. On the other hand, even if it is felt that gross income
should be retained in measuring damages, a second type of in-
struction-that the jury should not consider income taxes in
awarding damages-should be given, in order to prevent an un-
warranted bonus to the plaintiff as a result of the jury's probable
misunderstanding of the income tax laws.
Conclusion
The exemption of personal injury awards from income
taxes, being based on illogical grounds, has led to much con-
fusion and inconsistency. Unlike non-personal injury awards,
there is no need to examine the underlying claim. Like these
awards, punitive personal injury awards are taxable. One theme
runs throughout: courts are very strict in their interpretation
of exactly what constitutes a personal injury, holding that some
injuries to individuals are non-personal.
As for the defendant, his primary concern after the size of
the award has been determined is whether the payment is de-
ductible. It will be deductible only if the defendant can estab-
lish that the payment was a business expense.
The confusion of the exemption has extended into the court-
room. Whereas the majority of federal and state courts still use
gross income in measuring damages, this practice is now being
challenged, particularly in the federal courts. It is the conten-
tion of this writer that the gross earnings formula should be
retained, as only this formula is consistent with the public
policy behind the tax exemption of not overburdening the plain-
tiff. The net income formula would convert that policy into a
benefit for the defendant-a result clearly not indicated. None-
theless, the failure of courts to instruct the jury as to income tax
is not justified. Although there is admittedly no proof, it is felt
that the present practice in the Louisiana courtroom may in
94. Guerra v. W. J. Young Constr. Co., 165 So.2d 882 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964).
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many cases lead to unnecessarily large verdicts, working an un-
justifiable hardship on the defendant.
Paul H. Spaht
RESTRICTIONS ON MANAGEMENT RIGHTS-
UNION NEGOTIATION WAIVER
The National Labor Relations Act grants employees the
right of self-organization' and provides an elaborate machinery
for safeguarding that right by guaranteeing "laboratory" con-
ditions for the election of a collective-bargaining representative.2
If, after an unhampered decision, a majority of employees in
the appropriate unit designate a representative, the employer
is required to bargain with that representative concerning wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment3 until a
contract is concluded and reduced to writing, if one of the parties
should request it, 4 or until an impasse is reached. The Act im-
poses upon employer and union alike the duty to bargain in
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964):
"Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities.
The collective bargaining system as encouraged by Congress, admin-
istered by the Board, and enforced by the judiciary, of necessity subordi-
nates the interest of individual employees to collective interests of all em-
ployees in the appropriate unit. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The con-
stitutionality of the act was upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
2. The Board in General Shoe Corp. 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126-27 (1948) wrote:
"An election can serve its true purpose only if surrounding conditions
enable employees to register a free and untrammeled choice for or against
a bargaining representative. . . . In election proceedings, it is the Board's
function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted,
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited
desires of the employees. It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is
also our duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled."
3. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964):
"Sec. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such suit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to the rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment . .. ."
4. A refusal to sign is a refusal to bargain collectively and is an unfair
labor practice: section 8(a) (5). H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514
(1941).
